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While generally a steady ally of James Madison and the nationalists, Gouverneur Morris, delegate from 
Pennsylvania, worked from a different conception of republican politics.  Morris’ republicanism was 
more old than new, relying on the divided sovereignty of a mixed regime to protect the rights of 
citizens and minorities.  This conception, the paper argues, bears the stamp of Machiavelli, especially 
regarding the relationship of the classes and the role of the executive.  Like Machiavelli—but unlike 
Madison—Morris wanted to underscore society’s class divisions, which he saw as constant, organizing 
the representatives of rich and poor into two distinct, and hostile, chambers of the legislature.  And 
like Machiavelli, whose “civil prince” was the champion of the people, Morris’ executive was to be the 
“guardian of the people” and the “guardian of liberty.”  A final section of the paper looks at Morris’ 
personality and Convention maneuverings, some aspects of which are suggestive of Machiavelli.  A 
conclusion reviews Morris’ three main contributions to the Constitution. 
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“America’s Machiavellian:  Gouverneur Morris at the Constitutional Convention” 
 
The American Constitution, as represented by the Federalist Papers, is an instrument fully 
capable of remedying the ills most incident to republican government.  The optimism expressed 
by Publius, in papers 9, 10, and 51 especially, stemmed from the belief that the Constitution 
incorporated the discoveries of a new science of politics.  Included among these discoveries were 
separation of powers, bicameralism, representation, enlargement of the sphere, and compound 
government, or federalism; while included among the ills were oppression by the government and 
tyranny by the majority.  The new science provided for ordered liberty and moderate policies 
because government would be invigorated and yet checked, and because majorities would prevail 
electorally and yet be limited in their ambitions.  The extended size of the republic guaranteed a 
multiplicity of interests, which in turn guaranteed that no interest by itself would constitute a 
natural and permanent majority.  Majorities instead would be constructed and temporary alliances, 
coalitions of minor parties and shifting interests apt to fly apart the moment policy became unjust 
or too narrowly self-regarding.  The extended sphere, operating as an “invisible hand” of sorts, 
would cause majorities to temper their demands in order to hold together the coalitions on which 
they stood; and the institutions and practices of the new science, called “auxiliary precautions,” 
would oblige government to proceed slowly and rule by consensus.  Mild and considerate politics 
was the expected result, even though the people were engaged and no power outside the people, 
such as a king, looked after the common good.  
The Constitution, however, may not be exactly as the Federalist describes, if only because 
the parties responsible for drafting the Constitution were not all devotees of the new science of 
politics.  Some delegates to the Philadelphia Convention preferred a weak and dependent executive 
inconsistent with the doctrine of separated powers (e.g., Roger Sherman); or preferred a 
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unicameral in place of a bicameral legislature (e.g., Luther Martin); or wanted representatives to 
reflect public opinion rather than refine and check it (e.g., George Mason); or accepted 
enlargement of the sphere on condition that the union continue as a confederation of small 
republics (e.g., John Lansing); or sought instead a consolidated union with a single, central 
government, using states as administrative agents (e.g., George Read).  Much of the opposition 
came from delegates of the states’-rights persuasion, persons who subsequently joined the 
Antifederalist cause during the Ratification debates.  Opposition from the nationalist delegates 
tended to be ad hoc in character, like rejection of a national veto over state laws (e.g., John 
Rutledge) or of a council of revision consisting of the executive and members of the judiciary (e.g., 
Rufus King).  But there was one delegate on the nationalist side who mounted a more systematic 
challenge to the new science.  This was Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania.  Morris, it here is 
argued, spoke for an older science of politics, a theory of republicanism, with roots in Machiavelli, 
that trusted the defense of liberty to a mixed regime composed of fixed social orders, presided over 
by a strong executive.1 
                                                          
NOTES 
1 The new science of politics, according to Federalist 51, acknowledges the sovereignty of the people (“fountain 
of authority”), while requiring that it operate through constitutional structures that afford protection for minority rights.  
The old science of politics divides sovereignty across the social orders of a mixed regime, protecting minority rights 
by incorporating “a will in the community independent of the majority.” (See Gordon Wood, The Creation of the 
American Republic, 1776-1787 [New York: Norton, 1969], 554.)  Machiavelli embraces the mixed regime (Discourses 
on Livy 1.2.2-5) and for that reason is regarded an old republican.  In other respects, he is new, if not himself the 
progenitor of the new science (see Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli [Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1958], 61, 83, 232):  for example, he encourages acquisition (Prince 3) in opposition to the Classical-Christian 
tradition that encourages moderation.  But even here, more old than new is Machiavelli, insofar as acquisition for him 
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Re-Enter Morris 
“We are now at a full stop,” declared a disconsolate Roger Sherman, delegate from 
Connecticut.  The Convention had just split 5-5-1 (ayes, nays, divided) on the question of state 
suffrage in the upper house.  A previous vote taken on June 11 had favored suffrage proportionate 
to population;2 but opinion was turning, and on July 2 the forces of equal state suffrage—mostly 
small-state delegates—managed to produce this tie.   
July 2 was also the day when Gouverneur Morris, missing since May 31, returned to the 
Convention.  Morris was a New York native, born into a prosperous political family, who for the 
last decade had lived in Pennsylvania.  He was a big man, something over six feet tall (in an era 
                                                          
depends on war and conquest, whereas for his modern disciples (e.g., Montesquieu), it depends on commerce and 
industry.  (See J. Patrick Coby, Machiavelli’s Romans: Liberty and Greatness in the Discourse on Livy [Lantham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 1999], 146, 277-84; and J. Patrick Coby, Machiavelli’s Philanthropy,” History of Political 
Thought 20 [1999]: 618-26.  In these works I argue, in partial disagreement with Strauss, Harvey Mansfield [e.g., 
Machiavelli’s New Modes and Orders: A Study of the Discourses on Livy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979); 
Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996)], and some others that Machiavelli is an ancient 
more than he is a modern, urging adoption of Roman modes of governance and conquest; and that his originality—
his “new modes and orders” and his “path as yet untrodden by anyone” [D.1.Preface.1]—consist mainly of reforms 
of Rome’s constitution toward the end of better controlling and energizing executive power, in the first instance; and, 
in the second, of a propagandistic use of history and a writing style designed to teach the art of prudence [Machiavelli’s 
Romans, 195-223].)  I do not mean to suggest that Morris rejected the institutions of the new science; I only suggest 
that he questioned their sufficiency in safeguarding liberty. 
2 By a vote of 6-5, the Convention on June 11 approved “some equitable ratio of representation”—i.e., suffrage 
proportionate to population—for the upper house; and on June 19, by a vote of 7-3-1, the Convention adopted the 
revised Virginia Plan, which made representation for the upper house proportional (Resolution 8).  Votes taken on 
June 11 (7-3-1), June 19 (7-3-1), and June 29 (6-4-1) applied proportionality to the lower house. 
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when the average male height was 5’6”) and as a youth nicknamed Tall Boy.  He would have 
towered above all but a few of the delegates; and if he rambled about the room while speaking, he 
would have entranced the members—or irritated them—with the recurrent thumping of his 
wooden peg leg.  An unusual individual, to be sure, whom a fellow delegate described as a wit and 
a genius, “conspicuous and flourishing in public debate,” charming, captivating, and a pleasure to 
hear; but also “fickle and inconstant—never pursuing one train of thinking—nor ever regular.”3 
Morris took the floor; and being neither diffident nor apologetic about his month-long 
absence, he immediately set about accusing the Convention of having misconstrued the basic 
nature of an upper house, whether conceived as a body representing states or representing people.  
For in fact, the purpose of an upper house, he averred, was to represent wealth.  So vital was this 
function, and so uncertain of success, that the upper house, or senate, was to be constructed as a 
set-aside for the propertied few.  The rationale was what truly amazed, however—namely, that the 
wealthy must be given a chamber of their own lest they infiltrate and dominate the chamber of the 
people.  “The proper security against them [the wealthy],” said Morris, “is to form them into a 
                                                          
3 William Pierce of Georgia wrote brief character sketches of the Convention delegates.  These are found in volume 
3 of Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, rev. ed., 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1966, 1987), 87-97.  Volumes 1 and 2 of Farrand contain the notes taken by Convention delegates (excluding 
those taken by John Lansing, in the fourth-volume supplement edited by James Hutson, 1987).  Citations of 
Convention debates are identified by date, volume, and page number (e.g., May 31, 1:48) and are kept in the text.  
References to volume 3, which contains Convention related materials, like the Pierce sketches, show the editor’s name, 
the book’s title, volume number, and page number (e.g., Farrand, Federal Convention, 3:106) and are placed in the 
footnotes.  Misspellings of proper names are corrected; otherwise original spellings are retained.  Original punctuation 
is also retained, except in cases where it interferes with comprehension.  Full words usually replace abbreviations. 
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separate interest” (1:512).  An aristocratic/oligarchic institution, characteristic of mixed regimes, 
would deliver a partially democratic result, he seemed to promise. 
Morris was not the only Convention delegate promoting the representation of property.  
The Virginia Plan, introduced by Virginia governor Edmund Randolph at the start of the 
proceedings and organizing debate thereafter, was open to the idea (Resolution 2); and assorted 
delegates, the South Carolinians especially, returned to it repeatedly.  Nor was Morris the only 
person at the time to propose the sequestration of wealth.  For outside the Convention, though 
present “virtually,” was John Adams, whose recently published book, A Defence of the 
Constitutions of Government of the United States, volume 1, was on sale in Philadelphia and likely 
included in the collection of the Library Company of Philadelphia, to which the Convention 
delegates had free access.4 
                                                          
4 Adams’ book was listed in the Library’s catalogue of 1807, which had absorbed and replaced the catalogue of 
1789 (http://librarycompany.org/about/history.htm).  Luther Martin of Maryland once referenced Adams’ Defence 
during the debates (June 27, 1:439); and Madison spoke of it in a June 6 letter to Jefferson (The Papers of James 
Madison, eds. Robert Rutland, et. al. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977], 10:29).  The editor of the Works 
of John Adams, Adams’ grandson, Charles Francis Adams, stated that the edition printed in Philadelphia “was much 
circulated in the convention” (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1850-56), 4:276.  That point was partly confirmed by 
John Adams’ friend, Cotton Tufts, who informed Adams in June that his book “came to America at a very critical 
moment just before the meeting of the grand convention at Philadelphia for revising and amending the confederation, 
when the subject of your book will naturally be much talked of and attended to by many of the greatest statesmen 
from all parts of the United States (quoted by Page Smith, John Adams, vol. 2 [Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co. 
1962], 698-99).  Benjamin Rush was among the statesmen favorably impressed, reporting in a letter to Richard Price 
that “Mr. Adams’s book has diffused such excellent principles among us, that there is little doubt of our adopting a 
vigorous and compounded federal legislature (Farrand, Federal Convention, 3: 33). 
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Adams used the word “ostracism” to describe the exclusion of the rich, the well-born, and 
the able from the lower house of a legislative body.5  Segregating society’s luminaries was the 
function of an upper house, he reasoned, for if allowed to commingle with persons of lesser talents, 
these “natural aristocrats,” as he styled them,6 would rise to the top and quickly take command, 
robbing the lower house of its distinctive quality.  But with the classes kept apart in separate 
chambers, the two chambers would be genuinely different and able to check each other. 
Morris’ July 2 intervention seemed then to be channeling Adams’ thought.  But not only 
Adams’, for behind Adams stood the great Florentine political philosopher, Niccolò Machiavelli.  
Adams reproduced selections from Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy in volume 1 of his Defence; 
and in volume 2 he provided a 100-page transcription of and commentary on Machiavelli’s 
Florentine Histories, plus an abridgement and critique of Machiavelli’s Discourse upon the Proper 
Ways and Means of Reforming the Government of Florence.  C. Bradley Thompson discusses the 
Machiavellian influence on Adams.7  Other scholars find echoes of Machiavelli in the writings of 
Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson.8  No one before though has suggested that Machiavelli 
                                                          
5 J. Adams, Work, 4:290-91, 444-45; 5:185-87. 
6 Ibid,. 4:397. 
7 C. Bradley Thompson, “John Adams’ Machiavellian Moment,” Review of Politics 57 (Summer, 1995): 389-
417. 
8 Hamilton is counted a disciple despite the presence of only two Machiavelli citations in his works, both of them 
negative (Karl Walling, “Was Alexander Hamilton a Machiavellian Statesman?” Review of Politics 57 [Summer, 
1995]: 419-47); while Jefferson is counted a disciple on the strength of one citation, also negative (Paul A. Rahe, 
“Thomas Jefferson’s Machiavellian Political Science,” Review of Politics 57 [Summer, 1995]: 449-81).  Claiming for 
Jefferson an indebtedness to Machiavelli, Rahe says, “one does not have to cite an author or, for that matter, even 
peruse his works to absorb something of his doctrine and to come under his sway”; and, “Machiavelli exercised a 
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affected the constitutional thinking of Gouverneur Morris.  In making that case,9 I am mindful of 
the fact that Morris was an “inconstant” thinker and a “fickle” personality.  One of the many 
                                                          
species of intellectual hegemony over republican thought in the eighteenth century exceeded by none but John Locke” 
(450-51).  John Lamberton Harper, who develops the parallels between Hamiltonian and Machiavellian foreign policy, 
says, “only the frank and feisty Adams admitted to having learned from Machiavelli” (American Machiavellian: 
Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 5. 
9 Whether Morris ever read, much less absorbed and consciously utilized, Machiavelli cannot be conclusively 
established.  His home in Westchester County, New York, called Morrisania, contained some 4,000 volumes, far 
exceeding (says one biographer) the family libraries of all the Founders combined.  In the estimation of contemporary 
Ezra Stiles, the library at Morrisania was second only to that of Harvard College.  Very possibly, but not for certain, 
works by Machiavelli were a part of the collection.  The contents were never inventoried, and during the British 
occupation, the books were dispersed, stolen, or destroyed (William Howard Adams, Gouverneur Morris: An 
Independent Life [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003], 11-12, 75-76; James J. Kirschke, Gouverneur Morris: 
Author, Statesman, and Man of the World [New York: Thomas Dunn Books, 2005], 10).  It can though be established 
that for all the years that Morris lived in Philadelphia, he had ready access to Machiavelli, because a two-volume 
Works of Nicolas Machiavel, plus a separate edition of Machiavelli’s History of Florence, were listed in the 1770 
catalogue of the Library Company of Philadelphia and so included in its holdings 
(http://librarycompany.org/about/history.htm).  Morris (to my knowledge) did not cite Machiavelli in any of his 
writings, public or private, but then Morris cited rather few authors, and the ones he did cite were generally poets and 
playwrights.  Montesquieu he cited, and Roman history he referenced, including, late in life, a comparison of Roman 
religion and Christianity (J. Jackson Barlow, ed. To Secure the Blessings of Liberty: Selected Writings of Gouverneur 
Morris, [Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2012], 647-48), a prominent theme in the Discourses (e.g., 2.2.2).  But the fact 
remains that the case for Machiavellian influence is circumstantial.  Readers who require more should then suppose 
the paper to be exploring an uncanny similarity in the thinking of Morris and Machiavelli that goes to explain why 
Morris was not the same sort of nationalist as Madison.  Readers less uncomfortable with circumstantial evidence 
might further suppose, with me, that Morris was actually drawing on Machiavelli, applying the Florentine’s mixed-
regime reasoning to the constitutional problems encountered at the Convention, especially the true nature and right 
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biographies of him is titled “An Incautious Man”.10  Of course, Morris’ incaution, or impetuosity, 
might just be another point of contact with Machiavelli. 
 
 
 
                                                          
organization of the legislative and executive powers.  Of course, to suggest that Machiavelli was a background, 
intellectual source for Morris is not to deny that foreground, experiential influences were also at work, such as Morris’ 
time in New York politics, in the Continental Congress, and in the offices of Robert Morris. 
10 Melanie Randolph Miller, An Incautious Man: The Life of Gouverneur Morris (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 
2008).  Morris is  the subject of this and of ten previous biographies:  Jared Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, 
with Selections from His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers, 3 vols. (Boston: Gray & Bowen, 1832); 
Theodore Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1888); Daniel Walther, Gouverneur 
Morris: Witness of Two Revolutions (New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1934); Howard Swiggett, The Extraordinary 
Mr. Morris (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday & Co., 1952); Max M. Mintz, Gouverneur Morris and the American 
Revolution (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970); Mary-Jo Kline, Gouverneur Morris and the New 
Nation, 1775-1778 (New York: Arno Press, 1978); W.H. Adams, GM: An Independent Life, 2003; Richard 
Brookhiser, Gentleman Revolutionary: Gouverneur Morris, the Rake Who Wrote the Constitution (New York: Free 
Press, 2003); Kirschke, GM: Author, Statesman, 2005; and Melanie Randolph Miller, Envoy to the Terror: 
Gouverneur Morris and the French Revolution (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005).  But however often and well-
told his life story, the political thought of Morris has received relatively little scholarly attention:  one article (Donald 
L. Robinson, “Gouverneur Morris and the Design of the American Presidency,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 17 
[1987]: 319-28); one book chapter (Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism, 
chap. 3 [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990]); several pages of another book chapter (Nathan Tarcov, “The 
Social Theory of the Founders,” in Confronting the Constitution, ed. Alan Bloom [Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 
1990]); an unpublished doctoral dissertation (Arthur P. Kaufman, “The Constitutional Views of Gouverneur Morris,” 
Ph.D. diss. [Georgetown University, 1992]); and an online essay (Forrest McDonald, “The Political Thought of 
Gouverneur Morris,” [theimaginativeconservative.org., 2013]).  One of the biographies listed above devotes a chapter 
to Morris’ role in writing the Constitution (Kirschke, GM: Author, Statesman, chap. 5). 
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Senate 
In a country without a titled nobility to represent, such as the peers of Great Britain, what 
was the purpose of an upper house?  That question was raised by the French economist Jacques 
Turgot in a letter to the English moral philosopher, dissenting minister, and political pamphleteer 
Richard Price.  The reprinting of Turgot’s letter in 1784 was what prompted Adams to write his 
three-volume tome defending the bicameral structure of America’s newly formed state 
governments and their adoption of separated powers.  At the Convention, George Mason of 
Virginia confidently pronounced that the American mind—apparently unaffected by Price and 
Turgot—was settled in favor of bicameralism (June 20, 1:339).   
Perhaps not entirely settled, however, as Charles Pinckney of South Carolina came very 
close to reposing the Turgot question.11  In a lengthy speech delivered on June 25, Pinckney 
described America as an egalitarian country without Old World social orders or concentrations of 
great wealth; with only occupational classes of little consequence, because these classes were 
politically equal and mutually dependent, so much so that they effectively had but one interest.  
Moreover, with a vast and empty frontier to inhabit, the country was destined to remain “but one 
great & equal body of citizens” for many years to come (1:397-404).  Hence no reason existed to 
imitate the British constitution, however well-suited for Britain it might be.12 
                                                          
11 Unicameralism was in fact the preference of a number of delegates.  Those who spoke for it were Benjamin 
Franklin (May 31, 1:48), William Paterson (June 16, 1:251), Oliver Ellsworth (June 16, 1:255), John Lansing (June 
20, 1:336), Luther Martin (June 20, 1:340; June 27, 1:439), and Roger Sherman (June 20, 1:341, 343).  
12 Pinckney did favor a senate, but he gave no reason why; nor did he in the June 25 speech say much about its 
organization.  His plan of government, placed before the Convention on May 29, supplied a few details.  The Pinckney 
Plan is a complicated affair:  see Farrand, Federal Convention, 2:134-37; 3:106-23, 427-28, 595-609.  
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Morris missed Pinckney’s speech, but his own speech on July 2, coupled with those on 
July 6 and July 19, seemed designed as a rebuttal.  The object of the second branch, Morris 
maintained, was “to check the precipitation, changeableness, and excesses of the first branch.”  
The misbehavior of state legislatures—which had inspired Virginia’s James Madison to pen his 
pre-Convention memorandum, “Vices of the Political System of the United States,” and which 
served as the premise for many of his Convention proposals—was cited as evidence that 
lawmaking by the people’s representatives posed a clear and continuing danger to “personal liberty 
private property & personal safety” (1:512).  Society was not one equal and interdependent mass, 
as supposed by Pinckney, but consisted of individuals of differing stations, any few of whom could 
be oppressed by the remainder.   
The checking function of the second branch, Morris claimed, depended on three essential 
elements:  interest, property, and independence.  While not dismissive of “Abilities and virtue,” 
Morris put greater store by personal interest: “. . . one interest must be opposed to another interest.  
Vices as they exist, must be turned against each other.”  Vice checking vice was the secret, not 
wisdom enlightening ignorance or goodness overcoming wickedness.  For Morris, personal 
property, accompanied by an “aristocratic spirit” that “love[d] to lord it thro’ pride,” was the 
interest and the attitude that properly defined a senate.  He allowed that pride was present across 
the human species but that it showed differently in the poor than in the rich.  In the poor it was 
reactive and resisting, in the rich assertive and abusive.  But notwithstanding the more aggressive 
nature of the rich, the poor generally predominated because of their huge advantage in numbers.  
Politically this meant that upper houses were creatures of lower houses, and experience at the state 
level seemed to confirm the relationship.  On the other hand, if provided a mode of election 
independent of the people and of their representatives, specifically appointment by the executive, 
along with lifetime tenure, senators would have the means and the motive to defend the 
11 
 
prerogatives of their office.  But would not rich and prideful senators, serving for life, do wrong, 
Morris asked.  His answer was likely intended to stun: “He believed so; he hoped so.” (1:512).  He 
hoped so! 
Madison, who would go as high as nine years for a senatorial term, hoped for “wisdom & 
virtue” from the senators, not wrongdoing, because he envisioned them as “the impartial umpires 
and Guardians of justice and general Good” (June 26, 1:423, 428).  After the Convention and 
writing as Publius, Madison paraphrased Morris’ “vice checking vice” line, stating in Federalist 
51, “ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”13  The purpose though of counteracting 
ambition was to control humanity’s non-angelic nature, not to afford it fresh opportunities for 
misconduct and to showcase its harm.14  Likewise, Adams was not naïve in outlining the 
characteristics of natural aristocrats.  Their special talents, he recognized, could easily be put to 
selfish purposes and result in “the destruction of the commonwealth”.15  But promotion from the 
lower to the upper house, he supposed, would work as an inducement to good behavior: “The 
senate becomes the great object of ambition; and the richest and the most sagacious wish to merit 
an advancement to it by services to the public in the house”.16  Among the champions of checks 
and balances, Morris then was exceptional in hoping for wrongdoing, and even Alexander 
Hamilton of New York, who with Morris supported lifetime terms, did so in order to “high-tone” 
the senate (June 26, 1:424). 
                                                          
13 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001). 
14 Lance Banning minimizes the importance of ambition-checking-ambition in Madison’s thought (The Sacred 
Fire Of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1995], 368). 
15 J. Adams, Works, 4:397. 
16 Ibid., 4:291. 
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Very similar to Morris, and possibly the source for his ruminations on the senate, is 
Machiavelli.  In Prince 9 Machiavelli states that two social classes, which he calls humors, are 
present in every city.  There is the humor of the great—Morris’ aristocrats, likewise said to exist 
in all civilized societies (July 6, 1:545)—and the humor of the people.  The great, or grandi, want 
to dominate and oppress; the people, or popolo, want to escape the domination and oppression of 
the great.  Machiavelli seems to be taking sides.  The same could be said of Morris, whose 
denunciation of wealth was uncompromising: “Wealth tends to corrupt the mind & nourish its love 
of power, and to stimulate it to oppression.  History proves this to be the spirit of the opulent” (July 
19, 2:52). 
The division between the humors reappears in the Discourses on Livy: “. . . in every 
republic are two diverse humors, that of the people and that of the great, and . . . all the laws that 
are made in favor of freedom arise from their disunion” (D.1.4.1).17  Freedom arises from the 
mutual suspicion and animosity of distinct social classes armed with the means of self-defense.  
Most previous commentators, including Livy, Machiavelli’s source, condemned Rome’s 
tumultuous domestic life;18 Machiavelli, on the contrary, credits tumults with providing Rome its 
good laws and good education, which in turn occasioned countless acts of personal virtue. 
The story of how the Roman humors acquired their institutional arms is told by Machiavelli 
in Discourses 1.2-3.  With the expulsion of King Tarquinius Superbus, the patricians assumed 
                                                          
17 Citations of Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy are from Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, trans. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); those of The Prince are from Harvey C. Mansfield, trans., 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); and those of the Florentine Histories are from Laura F. Banfield and 
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).  
18 Titus Livy, Ab Urbe Conditia, trans. B.O. Foster, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1922), 
4:9. 
13 
 
command of the city and Rome became in effect an aristocracy, or a partial mixed regime with 
consuls taking the place of kings (D.1.2.7).  But far from domineering and oppressing, the 
patricians “behaved humanely” toward the people.  Machiavelli accounts for this apparent 
contravention of his verdict on the great and of his wider judgment that “all men are bad,” or must 
be presumed bad by those who order republics,19 by claiming that “when any malignity remains 
hidden for a time, this proceeds from a hidden cause” (D.1.3.1).  Good government in early 
republican Rome resulted then from a hidden cause, specifically the patricians’ fear that the people 
would restore the Tarquins if mistreated by their new rulers.  Thus, for as long as any of the royal 
line was alive and residing nearby, the nobles refrained from revealing their true, malignant nature.  
This circumstance obtained for thirteen years, from 509 to 496 B.C., not quite enough time, in 
Machiavelli’s estimation, for the plebs to have surrendered their pride and slumped into a state of 
credulous docility.  The death of the last of the Tarquins was the “accident” that released the nobles 
from their fear and awakened the plebs to their danger.  When the nobles turned abusive, the people 
mustered their reactive pride and resisted, abandoning the city until the office of the tribunate was 
conceded to them as an instrument of self-protection.  Rome then passed from a partial mixed 
regime to a “perfected” mixed regime, combining kingly (consuls), aristocratic (senate), and 
democratic (tribunes) elements.  A popular assembly was added some years later.20 
                                                          
19 Morris uttered similar sentiments in a letter to Washington dated October 30, 1787: “. . . men must be treated as 
men, and not as machines, much less as philosophers, and least of all things as reasonable creatures, seeing that in 
effect they reason not to direct, but to excuse, their conduct” (Sparks, Life of GM, 1:290). 
20 This was the plebian council, or concilium plebis, the origins of which are obscure.  Its decisions, called 
plebiscites, applied only to the plebs, until 287 B.C., when, with passage of the Hortenisan law, the plebeian council 
was folded into the tribal assembly, or comitia tributa.  See Kurt von Fritz, The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in 
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Why would Morris hope for wrongdoing by the rich quarantined in an upper house of their 
own?  Because a well-defined class opponent, whose malignity was on full display, would arouse 
the jealousy and distrust of the people; and because an aroused and vigilant people would safeguard 
their liberty against encroachments by the wealthy.  “By thus combining & setting apart, the 
aristocratic interest,” Morris thought, “the popular interest will be combined against it.  There will 
be a mutual check and mutual security” (July 2, 1:513).21  Jennifer Nedelsky puts it thus: “It was 
as though the isolation of the rich in an explicitly aristocratic body would alert the people to their 
threats; it would be harder for the wealthy to pass off their interests as the public interest.”22  Arthur 
Kaufman emphasizes these institutional markers: “As representatives of a national class, [senators] 
could more readily be held to account for their positions on national legislation: ‘The aristocracy 
(the wealthy) support, or the aristocracy (the wealthy) oppose, this legislation,’ it might be said.”23  
On the other hand, if the two classes were intermixed in an upper house constituted along the lines 
of the lower house and elected popularly, either an oligarchy or a democracy would develop, 
depending on whether the society was commercial or agrarian.   
                                                          
Antiquity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), 236-38; Claude Nicolet, The World of the Citizen in 
Republican Rome (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 224-25, 228.  
21 Morris applied his analysis of class division and the legislative power to French politics, when two years later 
he was in Paris witnessing the demise of the Estates General: “Suppose all distinctions gone, and one body of 
representatives appointed for this great kingdom, on whom will the choice fall? . . . . Will not the rich and the great be 
chosen? . . . . Is it not most wise to put all these enemies in one body together, and not suffer them to elude the vigilance 
of observation, by dressing in the popular garb?  Why suffer the wolves, (if wolves they be) to occupy the place, which 
should be reserved for the shepherd?” (Barlow, Selected Writings of GM, 235). 
22 Nedlesky, Private Property, 80. 
23 Kaufman, “Constitutional Views of GM,” 335. 
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The former result received considerable attention from Morris.  Commerce would remove 
the poor from farms to cities, where they would be put to work as manufacturers and mechanics 
in the employ of factory owners and at their mercy.  If also enfranchised, the voting poor would 
feel the influence of their economic masters, if not have their votes outright bought, and the power 
of the aristocracy would increase thereby (August 7, 2:202-03).24  Further advantage would accrue 
to the rich if the country were also large, as they would have the resources to “communicate & act 
in concert” across great distances.  The rich would manipulate the passions of the people and 
“make these the instruments for oppressing them”; while the people, “never act[ing] from reason 
alone,” would “be the dupes of those who [had] more knowledge & intercourse.”  Madison argued 
that size and diversity would break apart economic factions, forcing the construction of temporary 
coalitions for electoral and legislative purposes; and that moderation and justice would be the 
inadvertent byproducts of this necessity to combine and recombine for political success (June 6, 
1:134-36).  Morris concluded, contrarily, that a “violent aristocracy” would be the result of an 
extended, commercial republic lacking a class-identified bicameral legislature (July 2, 1:514).25 
Morris did not explain why in an agrarian society a democracy would emerge from the 
legislative intermixing of rich and poor, except to reference the historical record as certain proof.  
Perhaps he supposed that with agriculture would come small, uniform, egalitarian republics, whose 
politics would perforce be a reflection of the popular interest.26  Perhaps he meant to apply that 
                                                          
24 In a letter to Robert R. Livingston dated October 10, 1802, Morris described universal suffrage as an aristocratic 
feature of American government, notwithstanding its democratic form (Sparks, Life of GM, 3:172). 
25 Robinson, “GM and the American Presidency,” 324. 
26 Commercial society produces complexity, disparities of wealth, and community-wide avariciousness 
incompatible with democracy, which requires simplicity, equality, and frugality (D.1.55; Nedelsky, Private Property, 
88). 
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other side of his analysis whereby upper houses were the “creatures” of lower houses, sinking into 
“servile complaisance” if deprived of those institutional protections that made for their 
independence:  e.g., non-popular election, life tenure, property qualifications.  An upper house that 
merely replicated the lower house was worse than useless, and a government would be “better 
without it,” thought Morris (July 2, 1:512). 
Machiavelli is also alarmed by the prospect of patricians becoming like plebeians, as might 
happen if the former courted the votes of the latter.27  Rome was once saved by its senators when 
they resisted the people’s demand for relocating half of the population to Veii, an Etruscan town 
conquered by Rome but more splendid in its buildings and countryside.  Because the senators 
represented a distinct social order, they had the wherewithal, and some of them the personal 
authority, to face down the inflamed populace.  Persuading the public is difficult, says Machiavelli, 
because a policy that promises gain and excites the spirit will always be preferred by the people, 
notwithstanding the loss and danger contained within.  As a case in point, Fabius Maximus was 
unable to persuade his fellow citizens of the wisdom of delaying combat with Hannibal, because 
delay seemed cowardly and because quick success was assured by others; consequently, three ill-
conceived battles were fought and lost, causing the near ruin of Rome (D.1.53.1-2). 
This turnabout in portrayal from malignant oppressors to wise and careful counselors 
occurred in Morris too.  It is to be remembered that Morris introduced the senate as a careful, sober 
check on the unwise haste and inconstancy of the lower house.  In that vein (though not yet 
                                                          
27 In the Florentine Histories, Machiavelli praises the Roman nobility for extending governing opportunities to the 
plebs in a manner that encouraged them to imitate the martial qualities of the nobles; and he blames the Florentine 
populace for withholding governing opportunities from the nobles unless they conducted themselves in a manner 
similar to the people (3.1).  
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reported), he proceeded to describe senators as among “the best, the most able, and the most 
virtuous citizens”; he defended their lifetime appointment as a safeguard against a change of 
measures;28 and he charged them with responsibility for service as a “select and sagacious body of 
men, instituted to watch against [encroachments] on all sides.”  Rather than one of the sides from 
which encroachments were anticipated, the senate was now depicted as rising above the 
competition and operating as a guard.  Nedelsky accounts for the change by postulating 
“ambivalence” in Morris toward the rich;29 Nathan Tarcov calls it “an extra fillip on top of the 
more solid considerations of class interest, human pride, and institutional responsibility.”30  More 
likely though—or additionally—it was a recognition that with a different set of interests, different 
behaviors could be expected.  Because senators would have lifetime appointments, the long-term 
well-being of the country and the effectiveness of government would become their concern.  
Dedication to the common good would arise from the alignment of class interest with the public 
interest.  This potential for good was best captured in the notes of Robert Yates, who recorded 
Morris as saying: “Give them the second branch and you secure their weight for the public good.  
They become responsible for their conduct . . .” (July 2, 1:517; also July 6, 1:545).31  Morris, it 
seems, did not discount the possibility that effective checking of senatorial malignity, coupled with 
exposure and responsibility, might result in enlightened behavior beneficial to all.  Perhaps in the 
end Morris was attempting to co-opt a portion of the rich, installed as permanent lawmakers, to 
                                                          
28 Barlow, Selected Writings of GM, 237. 
29 Nedelsky, Private Property, 80-81. 
30 Tarcov, “Social Theory of the Founders,” 177. 
31 Morris attributed such far-seeing stewardship to the British king, whose tenure was hereditary (July 20, 2:68; 
July 21, 2:76). 
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police the remainder of the rich, busy with money-making in the private economy—i.e., a quasi-
aristocracy recruited from the oligarchical class.32  Extracting good from bad, and not just 
preventing bad, was a small, but real, part of Morris’ constitutional thinking. 
In the main though Morris put his faith in vice rather than virtue.  On three other occasions 
during the July 2 speech did Morris show himself accepting of the dark side of human nature.  
Appointment of senators to executive offices—tightly circumscribed under the Virginia Plan 
(Resolution 5)—was approved by Morris for the somewhat scandalous reason that competent 
government rested on influence, which Hamilton, when taking the same position on June 22, was 
happy to call corruption (1:376).  Morris opposed payment of senators, but not for the high-minded 
reason given by Benjamin Franklin when discussing the presidency—that non-payment would 
attract the “wise and the moderate” rather than the “bold and the violent” and that the example of 
General Washington, who had accepted no pay during the eight years of war, proved the feasibility 
of gratis service (June 2, 1:82, 84-85).  No, because senators would find sub-rosa ways of paying 
themselves and because non-payment would accomplish a property qualification without having 
to legislate one.  And whereas Adams saw election to the upper house as an encouragement to and 
reward for good behavior, Morris saw it as a “bribe” and “noble bait” for demagogues in the states 
(July 2, 1:513-14). 
In sum, when Morris took the floor on July 2, reintroducing himself to the Convention, he 
provided the delegates with a blueprint for the national legislature, modeled on, or reminiscent of, 
a Machiavellian mixed regime, in which a plebeian house was checked by a patrician senate, each 
the class enemy of the other.  But unless the senate was distinctive in character and design, its 
                                                          
32 Machiavelli includes co-optation among the techniques of indirect rule practiced by the Roman senate 
(D.3.11.1). 
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independence ensured by a mode of election free of popular influence, it would, Morris argued, 
succumb to the house, standing for the people; or, in a large commercial society, an oligarchy 
would emerge as the rich, being better organized and informed, would manipulate and buy off the 
poor.  Accordingly, Morris required his senators to be wealthy, prideful grandees with lifetime, 
unpaid appointments made by the executive, and confined to a chamber of their own.  As a side 
benefit, the Convention’s month-long squabble over equal vs. proportional representation became 
a moot point.  The senate would not be representing states or people, but property, with members 
selected irrespective of residence.  Resetting a stalled debate may have been for Morris a second 
intention, along with apprising the Convention of an older science of politics, originating with 
Machiavelli and promoted by Adams. 
Presidency 
As he had done with the senate on July 2, so on July 19 Morris offered a comprehensive 
statement regarding the purpose and organization of the executive.  And as he had astounded the 
delegates with his proposal for a lifetime senate representing wealth, so again he astounded them 
with his description of the president as the “guardian of the people” (2:52).  Most delegates gave 
that distinction to the legislature, especially its lower house.  For example, Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts claimed that he “relied . . . on the Representatives of the people as the guardians of 
their Rights & interests” (July 21, 2:75). 
The origin of this expression, “guardian of the people,” and later “guardian of liberty,” may 
trace to Machiavelli, who devotes two chapters of the Discourses to the constitutional function of 
guarding.  In Discourses 1.5 Machiavelli asks which of society’s humors, the great or the people, 
provides a more reliable guard of freedom.  Guardianship appears not to be a separate office of 
state, but a disposition to defend the constitution, its distribution and balance of power.  As 
Machiavelli frames the issue, the candidates for the title are themselves combatants in the struggle 
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for class ascendancy; so a guardian is one who simultaneously is an interested party and a judge 
who holds all parties in their place.  Machiavelli admits that the question is not easily settled, 
because history and reason suggest opposing answers.  Among ancient republics, Sparta trusted its 
nobles with the task of guarding the constitution, as did Venice among modern republics; and both 
preserved their liberty longer than did Rome, which trusted the guardianship to the people.  But a 
different answer is arrived at through reason, which inquires into the motivations and behaviors of 
actors and discovers that those who possess wealth and power never cease from their acquisitive 
labors, because they are anxious and fear losing what they hold already unless more of the same 
is added; also, they have resources and are better positioned to acquire.  (Morris’ rational inquiries 
arrived at the same conclusion, that the wealthy were insatiably rapacious, and that they also 
possessed the means to “communicate & act in concert.”)  The argument is consonant with 
Machiavelli’s other judgment that the great wish to oppress and the people wish not to be 
oppressed.  As for the contrary evidence of history, Machiavelli disposes of it by distinguishing 
between expansionary and non-expansionary states.  The former, of which Rome was the prime 
example, need the populace to fight their wars and so must bend toward the popular interest; while 
the latter, with Sparta and Venice as examples, can afford to depoliticize the people.  Tumults are 
the result of a politicized people, who have the military training and institutional representation to 
act on their envy and resentment.  The other part of the chapter’s title, besides guarding freedom, 
is causing tumults, and Machiavelli blames the “incorrect and ambitious behavior” of the great for 
rousing avarice in the people and tumult in Rome (D.1.5.4). 
Machiavelli continues the discussion in the following chapter, but with a focus on the 
constitutions of Sparta and Venice, whose mixed regimes, without a popular component, were 
aristocratic republics, Rome’s, by contrast, a democratic republic.  What prevented the oppression 
of the people by the great in these two aristocratic republics?  In the case of Sparta, its two kings 
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defended the people as a way of defending themselves against the nobles, with the result that the 
people, not fearing oppression, did not desire a share of rule; and the state, restricted in size and 
wealth by the laws of Lycurgus, could be governed by a few who socially were not so different 
from the many (D.1.6.2).  In the case of Venice, the status of noble was extended to all early 
inhabitants, who were called gentlemen, while later arrivals became the populace without political 
rights.  The ruling class was too numerous to profit from oppression, and the ruled had neither 
cause nor opportunity to revolt, because nothing was taken from them or asked of them, and their 
numbers were always kept fewer than that of the gentlemen class (D.1.6.1).  Accordingly, the 
aristocratic republics of Sparta and Venice were for many centuries united, tranquil, and free, but 
at the cost of staying small; while the democratic republic of Rome, for some shorter period of 
time, was united, tumultuous, and free, but with the prospect of growing great.  Machiavelli prefers 
expansionary Rome, because, as he famously pronounces, necessity mandates expansion, and a 
state not ordered for it will one day be destroyed by external or internal forces (D.1.6.4). 
Morris might initially have conceived of the senate as the guardian of liberty, for he 
described it, as observed, as a “watch against [encroachments]”; but then the Convention did not 
give him the senate he wanted—an aristocratic body with members serving for life.  He certainly 
did not follow Machiavelli in placing the guard of freedom with the people, or with a tribunate or 
assembly providing them protection (D.1.6.4).  On the other hand, the part played by Machiavelli’s 
Spartan kings was strikingly similar to that which Morris assigned to the president;33 and possibly 
Morris intended the president for the role all along.  The advantage of such an arrangement would 
                                                          
33 The guard of freedom shifts in Machiavelli from the Spartan nobles to the Spartan kings.  Likewise in Morris, 
the guard shifted from the aristocrats (maybe) to the president.   
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be a guardian from outside the social orders operating as a neutral umpire, rather than a guardian 
from within trying not to operate as a judge in its own case. 
Morris placed the president at the center of a system of governmental checks and balances, 
responsible for blocking the senate, the house, and the legislature entire, all the while guarding the 
people, including “the lower classes.”  Legislative tyranny was Morris’ primary worry, partly 
because he foresaw the absorption of the lower house by the upper, as “the Great & the wealthy” 
would “in the course of things . . . necessarily compose the Legislative body.”  Failure to segregate 
property in a separate chamber, combined with the oligarchical effects of commerce, might have 
been the reasons for this dire prediction.  A united, and effectively unicameral, legislature—its 
lower house “seduced” by its upper—posed a mortal danger to the independence of the executive, 
whose work as “protector of the Mass of the people” required that it first defend itself (July 19, 
2:52)—the same co-dependent relationship that existed for the Spartan kings.  All of Morris’ 
executive-branch proposals aimed at establishing the executive’s independence,34 under threat by 
the humor of the great and acting for the benefit of the humor of the people.  In short, the president 
was to be what Machiavelli calls a “civil prince,” an executive who suppresses the great and 
befriends the people. 
The title of Prince 9 is “Of the Civil Principality.”  Machiavelli is in midst of delineating 
different kinds of princes (virtuous, fortunate, criminal), and the civil prince is said to be one who 
comes to power “with the support of his fellow citizens.”  That support is not registered by election, 
however, for the city Machiavelli presents is on the cusp of civil war, and the factions are each 
searching for a champion to help them defeat their class opponent.  This is where the humors are 
introduced, and the result of their competition, Machiavelli reckons, is “principality or liberty or 
                                                          
34 Kaufman, “Constitutional Views of GM,” 338, 351, 357. 
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license.”  The last of these outcomes, license, most likely describes the triumph of the people in a 
simple, democratic regime; for “the popular is without difficulty converted into the licentious,” 
says Machiavelli in the Discourses (1.2.2).  Principality, the first of these outcomes, most likely 
describes the transition of a civil prince (the chapter’s title) into an absolute prince (the chapter’s 
end).  Having come to power at the head of the popular cause, the prince might later choose to cast 
off all restraints and oppress the people no less than the great.  This princely absolutism appeared 
also in Morris’ July 2 speech, which warned of “a violent aristocracy, or a more violent despotism” 
resulting from the contest of the humors (1:514).  In other words, when the few and the many, in 
a commercial society, fall into class strife, the fate of the many, barring the construction of a civil 
principality, is either oppression by the few (“violent aristocracy”) or oppression by one (“violent 
despotism”).35  Liberty, the second outcome, would seem to describe the relationship of the civil 
prince to the people, whose standard-bearer he has become.  If the civil prince, content to rule 
through magistrates and guard the people, resists the temptation to seize absolute power—and 
Machiavelli specifies the hazards involved without supplying a remedy, as if to discourage the 
attempt—then liberty obtains.36  Machiavelli has no institutional contrivance to curb the ambition 
of princes, at least not in The Prince, only the advice of a wise counselor.  Morris, on the other 
hand, did—namely election, impeachment, and term of office. 
                                                          
35 Kaufman is of a different mind, describing violent despotism as majority tyranny (ibid., 333).  Nedelsky 
attributes the rise of both violent aristocracy and violent despotism to the misguided participation of the public (Private 
Property, 87).  Perhaps  though it would be better to say that majority tyranny and misguided populism correspond to 
Machiavelli’s licentious democracy coming to power in Morris’ agrarian society. 
36 The liberty outcome associated with civil principality is not to be confused with the political liberty of a republic, 
presented in Discourses 1.4.1.  For the classes in Prince 9 are, after all, vying with each other to surrender their 
political liberty to a prince in exchange for protection and vengeance. 
24 
 
The prince in Prince 9 is cautioned against assuming power with the aid of the great, whose 
jealousy can never be assuaged and who are conniving and quick to act; by contrast, the people 
are “more decent,” more easily satisfied, and too numerous to have as an enemy.  Also, the people, 
but not the great, are grateful, especially so, when expecting harm, they receive benefits instead.  
The suggestion is that a prince should first befriend the great, making use of their astuteness and 
energy; switch sides at the first opportunity, thereby ridding himself of envious and conspiracy-
prone supporters; and end by extending protection to the people.   
Discourses 1.16.5 recreates the situation in Prince 9:  domestic strife; an exiled former 
tyrant brought back to lead the aristocratic faction; a reversal of course, with the repatriated tyrant, 
now technically a civil prince, betraying his allies and offering them up to the vengeance of the 
people; and a partial restoration of freedom.  Security under the rule of law is the part of freedom 
that is restored to the people, not a share of power, which Machiavelli judges to be unnecessary 
because only “a small part of them desires to be free so as to command, but all the others, who are 
infinite, desire freedom so as to live secure.”  Machiavelli calculates that the political class, or 
those with whom power is shared, amount to no more than “forty or fifty citizens” in any republic; 
for the remainder, security is freedom enough. 
Morris’ executive, here compared to a Machiavellian civil prince, was, as noted, a guardian 
of the people in place of the people themselves.  Morris feared that the people, on account of 
economic dislocations, would, in a short time, be too corrupt to serve in that capacity: “Will 
[mechanics and manufacturers] be the secure & faithful Guardians of liberty?  Will they be the 
impregnable barrier against aristocracy?” (August 7, 2:202).  Assuming negative answers to these 
questions, Morris transferred guardianship to the president, a “great and illustrious” character who 
likely would hail from the nation’s wealthy elite (July 17, 2:31).  But he would not endeavor to 
advance their interests or satisfy their ambitions, since they, like Machiavelli’s great, would 
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“always covet his seat . . . perplex his administration . . .cabal with the Legislature, till [they 
succeeded] in supplanting him” (July 24, 2:104; also August 24, 2:404).  He rather would protect 
the people from the predatory behavior of his own kind, providing security under law, the sort of 
freedom the people actually desired.37   
But while a guardian of the people, the president would not quite be an advocate for the 
popular interest, passing “bad laws” on the people’s behalf.38  The people were noted for favoring 
paper money, tender laws, cancellation of debts, and redistribution of land (July 19, 2:52; July 21, 
2:76).39  The president would oppose these populist measures for the sake of property rights, the 
sanctity of contracts, and a sound economy, without which civilized society could not exist.40  In 
                                                          
37 Morris may not have wanted the people taking a too-active role in politics.  In short essays dating to the 
Revolutionary period, titled (sometimes) Political Enquiries, Morris made clear his preference for civil liberty—the 
individual’s right to be left alone—over political liberty—the collective’s right to rule.  In fact, Morris spoke quite 
disparagingly of political liberty: “A Nation of Politicians, neglecting their own Business for that of the State, would 
be the most weak miserable and contemptible Nation on Earth” (Barlow, Selected Writings of GM, 7).  Morris certainly 
did not neglect his own business:  on four separate occasions, when important affairs of state were pending, Morris 
excused himself for a time, or altogether, often to attend to his private concerns (Kirschke, GM: Author, Statesman, 
54-55, 69, 167, 200; also, W.H. Adams, GM: An Independent Life, 123-24).  McDonald associates civil liberty with 
commerce, and political liberty with legislative action; and he connects them both to Morris’ suspicion of the 
legislature and his promotion of the executive (“Political Thought of GM,” 3).  An excellent analysis of the Political 
Enquiries is provided by Kaufman (“Constitutional Views of GM,” 39-79).   
38 Judith A. Best, “Legislative Tyranny and the Liberation of the Executive: A View from the Founding,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 17 (Fall 1987):705. 
39 For another example of bad law, see “An American,” Letters on Public Finance for the Pennsylvania Packet, 
March 4, 1780 (Barlow, Selected Writings of GM, 124-30). 
40 Nedelsky, Private Property, 90-93. 
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similar fashion, Machiavelli advises his prince to be parsimonious, rather than liberal, because in 
order “to maintain the name for liberality among men, it is necessary not to leave out any kind of 
lavish display,” the sure result of which is state insolvency or imposition of confiscatory taxes 
(Prince 16).  Responsible for holding both classes in their place, but especially the great, the 
president would guard the constitution that guarded the liberty of all.  First, he would guard his 
own powers against usurpation by the legislative branch.   
The people though would perform this one function—they would serve as the electorate of 
the executive: “If he is to be the Guardian of the people,” said Morris, “let him be appointed by 
the people” (July 19, 2:53).  On July 17 Morris first proposed popular election of the president, 
giving his Pennsylvania colleague, James Wilson, desperately needed support (June 1, 1:68).  
Aside from Wilson, Morris seemed to be the only delegate (until then) who thought the people up 
to the task: “If the people should elect, they will never fail to prefer some man of distinguished 
character, or services; some man . . . of continental reputation” (2:29).41  Mason of Virginia, 
speaking soon after Morris, equated popular election with “a trial of colours” judged by “a blind 
man” (2:31).  A standard argument for election by the national legislature, as per the Virginia Plan 
(Resolution 7), was the expected return of candidates of a higher caliber (July 17, 2:29, 30); as the 
standard knock on the people was their propensity to prefer unfit mediocrities for office, with 
deficient information, local prejudice, and a chronic susceptibility to demagogues cited as causes.  
Morris paired at-large, popular election with a two-year tenure, indefinite reeligibility, and 
immunity from impeachment (July 19, 2:53-54).  The reason for this last provision was a 
conception of the president as a monarch in a mixed regime assisted by ministers who would stand 
                                                          
41 Machiavelli is conspicuous in promoting the idea that the people are a competent judge of character (D.1.47; 
1.58.3). 
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trial in his stead.  In furtherance of that conception, Morris alternately proposed lifetime 
appointment for the president should election by the legislature be approved over election by the 
people (2:53-54).42  Two days earlier, on July 17, the Convention committed a colossal blunder; it 
voted for executive election by the national legislature along with executive reeligibility, a 
combination of elements that vitiated executive independence.  Following the vote, James 
McClurg of Virginia moved adoption of tenure during good behavior.  Morris chimed in excitedly: 
“This was the way to get a good Government” (2:33).43 
But Morris was not exactly recommending a monarch-like executive:  He “was as little a 
friend to monarchy as any gentleman” (July 17, 2:35).  He rather worried that a badly constructed 
executive (respecting mode of election, term of office, reeligibility, and removal) would provoke 
the people into demanding a monarch.  In one particular, he rethought what a well-constructed 
executive required, reversing his position on impeachment.  He came to realize, his “opinion 
[having] been changed by the arguments used in the discussion,” that “our executive was not like 
a Magistrate having a life interest, much less having an hereditary interest in office. . . . This 
Magistrate is not the King but the prime-Minister.  The people are the King” (July 20, 2:68-69).  
Morris had been building his executive on the model of his senate, where the occupant[s] had “a 
                                                          
42 Morris’ flirtation with a monarch-like president had a counterpart in Machiavelli, many of whose republican 
leaders are described as monarch-like rulers (e.g., founders, reformers, captains).  Further confusing matters, or 
conflating regime types, Machiavelli uses the phrase “prince of a republic” (D.1.18.4).  See Morris’ comments on the 
French constitution of 1791 (Barlow, Selected Writings of GM, 270).   
43 Woody Holton speculates that Morris supported popular election and a two-year, renewable term of office 
because, in an extensive country, a successful president would be reelected indefinitely, making the term in effect a 
lifetime appointment (Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution [New York: Hill and Wang, 2007], 203-
04). 
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personal interest in checking the other branch” (July 2, 1:512).44  Toward that end, he nudged the 
executive in the direction of a monarch whose person was inviolable.  But conceding now that 
even a hereditary monarch, with the equivalent of “a fee simple in the whole Kingdom,” was not 
immune to bribery and corruption (and he gave an example from the reign of King Charles II), 
Morris concluded that the president should be held liable to impeachment, provided that no 
dependence on the legislature resulted thereby (July 20, 2:68-69).  Completing the conversion to 
a fully republican executive, Morris reiterated his call for a short term of office, after the 
Convention had heard proposals for terms as high as twenty years.  He cautioned that “a long 
period would prevent an adoption of the plan”; and he declared, brandishing his republican bona 
fides, that “it ought to do so,” for “he should himself be afraid to trust it” (July 24, 2:105).  
Though republican, the president was to be energetic like a king.  Morris began his account 
of the executive branch by citing “a maxim of Political Science that Republican Government is 
not adapted to a large extent of Country, because the energy of the Executive Magistracy can not 
reach the extreme parts of it” (July 19, 2:52).  John Dickinson of Delaware explained why that was 
so in remarks on June 2, saying, “a firm Executive could only exist in a limited monarchy” because 
of attachments to the crown and prerogatives enjoyed by it, which no elected president could hope 
to match.  Dickinson’s remedy was “the division of the Country into distinct States” (1:86); for 
the states would operate—as he clarified more completely in post-Convention essays—as feudal 
                                                          
44 Madison’s statement in Federalist 51, that “the interests of the man must be connected with the constitutional 
rights of the place,” looks again like a borrowing from Morris.  Hereditary succession is the logical conclusion of this 
idea. 
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magnates extending the power of the central government to the nation’s outermost parts.45  
Dickinson looked beyond the executive for a fix, whereas Morris challenged the rectitude of the 
maxim that a republican executive must be weak.  For if made guardian of the people in an office 
structured for the purpose, the president could, Morris believed, meld together erstwhile 
incompatible elements, namely republican government and extensive union.46   
Confronted with the same problem of republican weakness, Machiavelli commends the 
Romans for invigorating executive power through the office of the dictatorship.  Previous writers 
judged the dictatorship hazardous and the cause of Rome’s demise.  Machiavelli takes the contrary 
view:  republics, he observes, move in “slow motion” because power is divided and action must 
wait on the assent of many wills (D.1.34.3).  The remedy for that disability is the capacity to unite 
power on the sudden, in one person alone. 
Executive power in republican Rome was ordinarily divided between two consuls elected 
to one-year terms.  The dictator was a single, uno solo, executive supplanting the two consuls and 
resorted to in times of emergency; the term was for six months.  Despite the extraordinary character 
of the dictatorial power, Machiavelli calls it ordinary and safe, always doing good for the city, 
because it had the sanction of law and caused no scandal (D.1.34.1,3).  The remaining features of 
the dictatorship were full authority to act, but within a limited jurisdiction, and with the existing 
offices of government still in operation.  Full authority meant the power to decide without 
consultation and to punish without appeal.  Limited jurisdiction meant confinement to a stipulated 
                                                          
45 See Dickinson’s Letters of Fabius, especially Letter 8 (in Colleen Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell, eds., Friends 
of the Constitution: Writings of the “Other” Federalists, 1787-1788 [Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998], 91-97). 
46 Kaufmann, “Constitutional Views of GM,” 392. 
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task.  And continued operation meant checks and balances, ensuring that the dictator did not 
“escape his limits and . . . hurt the city” (D.1.34.2). 
Which of these positions did Morris share with Machiavelli?  Morris missed the debate on 
number—whether a single or plural executive—but was present when that debate resurfaced in the 
form of an executive council, whose consent might be required in order for the president to take 
action (September 7, 2:537; also June 4, 1:97).  Morris opposed the measure on the narrow grounds 
that such a council could be used as cover for a president’s bad decisions (2:542).  But Morris also 
laid before the Convention his own plan for an executive council.  Significantly, every officer of 
the council was to be appointed by the president and serve at his pleasure (August 20, 2:342-44), 
thus keeping intact executive autonomy and responsibility.   
Like Machiavelli, Morris, as noted, supported a relatively short term of office, as well as 
popular election of the executive, which was how Rome’s ordinary executives, the consuls, were 
chosen, though with qualifications.47  The extraordinary nature of the dictator’s office had no 
parallel in Morris, but the reason for hiding its extraordinariness behind a veil of legal normality 
                                                          
47 The centuriate assembly, or comitia centuriata, was where consuls and other high magistrates were elected.  The 
senate nominated candidates.  All citizens voted, but collected in “centuries” that skewed results toward the wealthy 
(see von Fritz, Mixed Constitution, 196, 235-36; Nicolet, World of the Citizen. 219-24).  American equivalents would 
be the electoral college (in lieu of direct popular election), its electors chosen by state legislatures (or the mode of 
choosing determined by the same), and the national legislature as the elector of last resort; also, election of 
representatives in extended electoral districts, including at-large, state-wide elections—these matters of detail 
determined by state legislatures but under supervision of the national legislature.  Morris generally supported such 
tempering devices, if only as compromises.  By contrast, the election of a dictator was by the consuls themselves, 
because recourse to a dictator necessarily implied some deficiency in the performance of the consuls, whose loss of 
authority would seem less shameful if given by them freely rather than taken from them by others (D.1.34.4). 
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did appear.  The occasion was the debate over executive reeligibility.  Most nationalists cited 
experience as their reason for preferring it, claiming that a term-limited executive would be 
removed from office just as he was becoming fully competent.  The argument though was 
unconvincing and effectively met by the expedient of a single term of extended duration.  
Accordingly, the Convention returned again and again to the Virginia Plan’s proposal for a single, 
seven-year term without the option of reelection.48  Morris, thinking more like a Machiavellian, 
added to the argument the prospect of usurpation by the incumbent—“Shut the Civil road to Glory 
and he may be compelled to seek it by the sword”—and defiance of law by the electorate—“In 
moments of pressing danger the tried abilities and established character of a favorite Magistrate 
will prevail over respect for the forms of the Constitution” (July 19, 2:53; also July 24, 2:104-05).  
Machiavelli also cautions against placing the public in a position of losing the state or breaking 
the law: “For when a like mode [i.e., concentrated power] is lacking in a republic, it is necessary 
either that it be ruined by observing the orders or that it break them so as not to be ruined” 
(D.1.34.3). 
The principal powers of the executive branch included veto, pardon, appointment, treaties, 
and commander-in-chief.  In most cases Morris pushed for full and exclusive exercise of these 
powers.  He recommended an absolute veto in the executive, though largely for defensive 
                                                          
48 Votes taken on June 2, July 17, July 24, July 26, and August 24 affirmed the Virginia Plan mode of electing the 
president.  Shlomo Slonim attributes the enduring attractiveness of the plan to the advantages it conferred on small 
and southern states alike; and the carryover of these same advantages into the electoral college, plus that institution’s 
neat balancing of national and confederal elements, is how he explains the final abandonment of the Virginia Plan 
mode (“The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc Congress for the Selection of a President,” 
Journal of American History 73 [June 1986], 55-56; see also Mintz, GM and the American Revolution, 195; Best, 
“Legislative Tyranny,” 707). 
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purposes, which was why he also supported involvement of the judiciary in a council of revision 
(August 7, 2:200; August 15, 2:299; July 21, 2:75-76, 78-79).  He wanted the pardon power 
exercised by the executive alone, even in cases of treason, which some delegates thought “too 
great a trust” and an investment “peculiarly improper” (September 15, 2:626-27).  He urged 
removal of the senate from a share of the appointment power (August 23, 2:389).  At a moment in 
the Convention when the treaty-making power rested with the senate, he expressed his misgivings 
and proposed as an amendment that treaties be ratified by law, which perforce would require the 
concurrence of the president (August 23, 2:392-93), whom he later referred to, and in this same 
context, as “the general Guardian of the National interests” (September 7, 2:541).49  The power of 
commander-in-chief was discussed in connection with state militias—when they would fall under 
federal control, how they would be armed and disciplined, who would appoint their officers—and 
in connection with the legislature’s power to “make war,” which on the suggestion of Madison 
and Gerry was changed to “declare war,” providing a clear instance of limited jurisdiction (August 
23, 2:384-88; August 18, 2:329-33).   Morris was not heard from on this last topic.50 
To recap:  Morris analyzed executive power using (whether deliberately or not)51 the 
Machiavellian concept of guardianship.  But rather than confer this responsibility on one of the 
                                                          
49 Jack N. Rakove remarks that Morris went further than other delegates in conceiving of the executive as the 
embodiment of “a coherent national interest” (Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 
[New York: Knopf, 1996], 266). 
50 See Michael J. Klarman, The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 218-26. 
51 It perhaps bears repeating that the many similarities tying Morris and Machiavelli together do not add up to 
certain proof that Morris actually read Machiavelli, much less that Morris was making conscious, if unattributed, use 
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social orders, as does Machiavelli when first raising the question, Morris designated the president 
the guardian of the people, the guardian of liberty, and finally the guardian of national interest.  As 
such, the people’s political involvement would be less direct and less constant than was the case 
with the Roman plebs.52  Morris’ departure from doctrine was more apparent than real, however, 
because Machiavelli allows that in non-expansionary states, such as Sparta, the executive might 
perform the task of guarding for a populace that is quiescent.  Did Morris see America as a non-
expansionary state (albeit an extensive one)?  That was his hope, as indicated by a 1781 letter to 
John Jay, in which Morris recommended that the western territories remain a wilderness lest they 
become a separate country.53  The category of civil prince provided a still stronger point of 
congruence.  The civil prince was an executive who made himself a friend of the people and 
adversary of the great.  For Machiavelli—describing principalities, not republics—that 
                                                          
of Machiavelli’s writings while speaking at the Convention.  It could rather be that Morris instinctively thought as 
Machiavelli thought and gravitated toward Machiavelli’s orbit without ever realizing it. 
52 Mansfield discerns a lessening of political involvement in Machiavelli’s representation of the Roman plebs, 
whose reputed removal from the center of party competition Mansfield calls the “impartial regime.”  The impartial 
regime reorients politics toward acquisition and distribution and away from claims of justice, inherently partial; and 
it reduces the public’s role to that of an electorate.  Mansfield regards the impartial regime as Machiavelli’s chief 
constitutional innovation, an improvement on the mixed regime of the ancients (Machiavelli’s Virtue, 115-16).  I differ 
with Mansfield on this point especially (Machiavelli’s Romans, 204-07). 
53 “The principles, which caused and which justify the present revolution, will cause and justify as many more, as 
time and circumstances may furnish occasion for.  The question then resolves itself into this:  shall we be bounded by 
a wilderness, or a rival nation?  Reason says the former, and bids us pursue the path which leads to it.  The blind 
avarice of dominion may propel us into another road, but it leads to ruin” (Sparks, Life of GM, 1:225).  See also Morris’ 
letter of November 25, 1803 to Henry W. Livingston (Farrand, Federal Convention, 3:401); Barlow, Selected Writings 
of GM, 351; and Swiggett, Extraordinary Mr. Morris, 120-21. 
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relationship rests on shrewdness, timeliness, treachery, and gratitude; for Morris—describing 
republics—it rested on popular election.  Additionally, Morris, like Machiavelli, sought energy in 
the executive, if not by an uno-solo dictator, jurisdictionally bound but otherwise omnipotent, then 
by a single president invested with specified powers exercised without constraints; and a short 
term of office lengthened by the prospect of reelection, providing surety against extraordinary 
extensions excused by emergencies.  
 
A Fickle, Inconstant, and Irregular Machiavellian 
In delegate Pierce’s assessment, Morris was not all profundity and splendid elocution; for 
he could be as well a fickle, inconstant, and irregular person, never pursuing a single train of 
thought.  The charge has some merit.  At the Convention, Morris generally displayed a 
Machiavellian temperament—presuming the worst of human beings—but he also, from time to 
time, revealed an optimistic, even idealistic, side to his personality.54  Morris once described 
himself “as a Representative of America” and of “the whole human race”; as a gentleman who 
could not “descend to think” that his Convention colleagues had “assembled to truck and bargain 
for [their] particular States,” and who was confident that a “reasonable & right” plan of government 
would be embraced by “all who have reasonable minds and sound intentions” (July 5, 1:529).  
When a southern delegate put these laudable sentiments to the test, speaking on behalf of purely 
sectional interests, Morris replied, “he [Morris] came here to form a compact for the good of 
America” (July 12, 1:593).  And when another southerner objected to locating the new government 
in a fixed place, fearing that a temporary site (in New York City, where the Congress presently 
sat) would become the permanent site, Morris declared, “such a distrust is inconsistent with all 
                                                          
54 Brookhiser, Gentleman Revolutionary, 28. 
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Government” (August 11, 2:261).  Morris the cynic suffered from occasional bouts of youthful 
idealism. 
And like a youth, he could be absurdly impulsive. “Let us have no Government at all,” he 
vented, if it were thought that national legislators could not be trusted to reapportion at their 
discretion (July 11, 1:583).  He was similarly hasty in the matter of regional differences: “If [the 
North-South divide] be real, instead of attempting to blend incompatible things, let us at once take 
a friendly leave of each other” (July 13, 1:604).  Morris was the first to countenance a partial union 
of the willing (May 30, 1:37).  
Morris advised the Convention to protect forevermore the voting advantage of the Atlantic 
states against untrustworthy westerners with different interests, while simultaneously urging 
southerners to trust that northern majorities in the national legislature would reapportion in the 
absence of a constitutional duty.  Madison noted the inconsistency: “At the same time that he 
recommended this implicit confidence to the Southern States in the Northern Majority, he was still 
more zealous in exhorting all to a jealousy of a Western Majority.  To reconcile the gentleman 
with himself, it must be imagined that he determined the human character by the points of the 
compass.”  Mason then joined the attack, explaining that confidence in the people’s representatives 
required that they actually be representative, which in turn required reapportionment reflective of 
population shifts (July 11, 1:583, 584, 586). 
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It was in defense of the principle of legislative discretion that Morris exposed himself to 
this ridicule and rebuke.55  He failed to preserve discretion as applied to reapportionment.56  But 
as applied to western states, he scored a sly and subtle victory, worthy of a Machiavellian fox. 
                                                          
55 The case for discretion rests on two assumptions:  that human judgment, operating in the present, is wiser than 
rules enacted in the past; and that human beings, unrestrained by rules, are trustworthy.  Morris did not generally share 
these assumptions (e.g., Farrand, Federal Convention, 3:418; Barlow, Selected Writings of GM, 429), but he 
championed discretion nonetheless.  Either Morris was being incoherent, as Madison implied, or Morris was executing 
a complicated rhetorical strategy risky to his reputation (like Junius Brutus simulating craziness in order to topple the 
Tarquins and institute a republic! [D.3.2]).  Possibly it was some of both; possibly his declarations of idealism and his 
youthful impetuosity were also some of both.  
56 On July 5, the Committee on Senate Suffrage presented its multi-part compromise, the primary provisions of 
which called for proportional representation of persons in the lower house, set at 1 representative per 40,000 
inhabitants, and equal representation of states in the upper house.  To the first provision, Morris offered two objections:  
that as “property was the main object of Society . . . it ought to be one measure of the influence due to those who were 
to be affected by the Government”; and that “the rule of representation ought to be so fixed as to secure to the Atlantic 
States a prevalence in the National Councils” (1:533).  Morris’ own position, offered the next day, was that the 
legislature should be free “to provide for changes in the relative importance of the States, and for the case of new 
States” (July 6, 1:540).  Relative importance would allow wealth as well as numbers to be taken into account.  Numbers 
could be known with certainty once a census was conducted, and several delegates from the South, expecting 
population increases in their states, insisted that the census be mandatory.  Wealth, by contrast, could only be surmised.  
If it were to factor in reapportionment, approximate judgments would have to suffice.  Morris fought the census 
tenaciously, appearing foolish to some colleagues (and many readers), because mixed-regime theory required that the 
social orders be empowered to defend themselves (Sparks, Life of GM, 2:247; 3:336). “Property ought to have its 
weight, but not all the weight,” he stated (July 10, 1:567).  Likewise, Lockean theory enshrined the importance of 
property, which Morris put ahead of life and liberty (July 5, 1:533).  In the end, Wilson settled the matter, arguing that 
wealth correlated with population and that the representation of population would accomplish the representation of 
wealth (July 13, 1:605-06). 
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Morris opposed the easy admission and equal treatment of western states.  He rated 
westerners “back members” from the “remote wilderness,” lacking in political talent and “always 
most averse to the best measures” (July 11, 1:583).  Unenlightened ploughmen were they, who 
could hardly complain of discriminations, such as under-representation, because they “would 
previously know the conditions on which they would possess their lands” (July 5, 1:534).57  More 
alarming than their uncouth backwardness was their supposed proclivity to draw the country into 
wars—e.g., with Spain over navigation rights on the Mississippi—that the maritime states would 
have to fight at sea (July 5, 1:533; July 13, 1:604).58  Also, the commercial interests of the North 
would suffer oppression if power shifted to the agrarian West (July 11, 1:583; July 13, 1:604).  
Like many northerner delegates, Morris worried that western migration would depopulate the 
North, but not the South, costing the North its majority status in the union.  He foresaw an 
inevitable conjoining of southern and western interests against the interests of the mid-Atlantic 
and northerner states: “It has been said that N.C. S.C., and Georgia only will in a little time have 
a majority of the people of America.  They must in that case include the great interior Country, 
and every thing was to be apprehended from their getting the power into their hands” (July 13, 
1:604-05).  Not remarked on the occasion, but no doubt in the back of Morris’ mind, was the 
prospect of slavery’s expansion into the West.59  Hence Morris wished to keep the country’s 
                                                          
57 Machiavelli explains the discriminations practiced against late-arriving Venetians in very nearly the same terms 
(D.1.6.1). 
58 Roosevelt confirms Morris’ prophecy, claiming that the War of 1812 was caused by the South and the West, 
while most of the war’s cost was borne by the East (Gouverneur Morris, 148).  See also Mintz (GM and the American 
Revolution, 187). 
59 Kaufman accounts for Morris’ opposition to western expansion mainly in light of Morris’ opposition to slavery 
(“Constitutional Views of GM,” 392, 404-29). 
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political center of gravity firmly in the East, even while acknowledging that western settlement 
could not be prevented (August 29, 2:454).  
Article XVII of the Committee of Detail report addressed the issue of new states.  Morris 
moved that the provision for admission “on the same terms with the original States” be omitted on 
grounds that “to bind down the Legislature” was improper (August 29, 2:454).  When he tried for 
discriminations in mid-July, he was roughed up in debate, especially by Wilson, who observed 
that such a policy would replicate the oppression visited on American colonies by the British 
Parliament, and that the certain result would be, as before, separation and independence (July 13, 
1:605).  This time the Convention became entangled in questions about the voluntary, or 
involuntary, disjunction of territories from their home states.  Over the course of two days (August 
29-30), the Convention took some eleven votes respecting the motion by Morris to omit, his 
substitute proposal, other substitutes to his substitute, and related matters.  Morris won all eleven 
votes, concluding with a 10-1 adoption of his lightly amended, substitute proposal.  Throughout it 
all, no one contested the removal of “same terms” treatment of western states, even though one 
delegate explained, just before the first and most consequential vote, that “existing small states 
enjoy equality now” because they are already in the union, and that “this reason is not applicable 
to new Western states” (August 29, 2:454).  For reasons not at all clear but likely having to do with 
backstage maneuverings orchestrated by Morris,60 the Convention discarded its preference for no 
                                                          
60 Some years later, in a letter to Henry W. Livingston (December 4, 1803), Morris reflected on the success of his 
substitute proposal and of his discrimination strategy practiced at the Convention: “In wording the third section of the 
fourth Article [of the Constitution], I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion [of new 
states from territories not possessed at the time of Constitution].  Candor obliges me to add my belief that had it been 
more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have been made” (Farrand, Federal Convention, 3:404). 
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discriminations and voted to leave equal or unequal treatment of new states to the discretion of the 
legislature.61  A small victory was this, perhaps never to be acted upon, but one that showed Morris, 
the foxy Machiavellian, striving to preserve his vision of America. 
 
Conclusion 
It is commonly observed that Gouverneur Morris spoke at the Convention more often than 
any other delegate despite missing a month of the proceedings.  By and large his comments were 
extensive, substantive, and provocative.  Sometimes they were consequential.  While the paper’s 
purpose is not to delineate all that Morris stood for and accomplished in Philadelphia, a quick 
mention of what arguably were his three most important contributions may be a good way to end. 
Morris paired representation with taxation and by so doing disrupted the regional battle-
lines that were forming around the issue of slavery (July 12, 1:592).  The South would pay for its 
slaves in the same proportion that its slaves were counted in the representation.  A large, multi-
faceted bargain was the eventual result, one part of which was a population-based direct tax that 
sat in the Constitution until removed by the Sixteenth Amendment.  Meanwhile, Morris delivered 
the Convention’s most eloquent and stinging denunciation of slavery and the slave trade (August 
8, 2:222).  
As a member of the Committee on Postponed Matters, Morris explained and defended an 
unsanctioned mode of electing the president that discarded the Convention’s often-affirmed 
                                                          
61 See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (New York: Random House, 2006), 274-75; 
Kirschke, GM: Author, Statesman, 194.  Might legislative discretion include suspension of the 1 per 40,000 
apportionment requirement (changed to 1 per 30,000)?  Possibly, since this requirement was once challenged, at the 
time of the Missouri Compromise, by some northerners who wanted the three-fifths counting of slaves denied to new, 
western states (Farrand, Federal Convention, 3:430; Klarman, Framers’ Coup, 277). 
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preference for election by the national legislature—namely, the electoral college (September 4, 5, 
6; 2:500, 512, 523-24).  Wilson was the main architect of this alternate mode, whose elements 
appeared piecemeal throughout the course of debate; but it was Morris, in committee, who must 
have assembled the elements and refined the plan.   
Finally, Morris composed the language of the Constitution, arranged the document into 
Articles and Sections, and supplied the Preamble.62  “We the People of the United States, in Order 
to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,” and so forth, is a Morris legacy. 
                                                          
62 Letter to Jared Sparks, April 8, 1831 (Farrand, Federal Convention, 3:499); also Morris’ letter to Timothy 
Pickering, December 22, 1814 (Farrand, Federal Convention, 3:420). 
